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 Resumen 
El presente artículo de investigación analiza mediante una metodología cualitativa la etapa 
entre 1570 y 1573, cuando Leonardo Donà fue embajador de la Serenissima en la corte de 
Felipe II. En Madrid, el futuro Doge llevó a cabo una acción diplomática delicada y comple-
ja. La duración de su embajada coincidió exactamente con los años de la guerra de Chipre 
y las circunstancias de su misión gravitaron en la órbita de esos eventos. En los tres años 
que pasó en la corte mantuvo relaciones constantes con el Soberano y su entourage. Entre 
la constitución de la Liga Santa, la batalla de Lepanto y la paz estipulada por Venecia con 
el Imperio Otomano sin el conocimiento de los “confederados”, Leonardo Donà ejerció 
su misión diplomática de manera ejemplar: colocó los intereses de la Serenissima antes de 
cualquier consideración de naturaleza personal y, con prudencia y astucia, pudo enfrentar 
la difícil misión de justificar a Filippo II la paz estipulada entre Venecia y la Sublime Puerta. 
La correspondencia del embajador veneciano de Madrid y dirigida al Senado veneciano 
está llena de consideraciones políticas de alto valor moral, inspiradas en un alto sentido del 
deber hacia el Signoria y, sobre todo, dictadas por un conocimiento refinado del arte de la 
diplomacia. Donà permaneció en Madrid hasta el 17 de septiembre de 1573.
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Abstract
This research article studies through a qualitative methodology perspective the period bet-
ween 1570 and 1573, when Leonardo Donà was ambassador of the Serenissima to the court 
of Philip II. In Madrid, the future Doge carried out a delicate and complex diplomatic 
assignment. The duration of his ambassadorship coincided exactly with the years of the Cy-
prus War and the circumstances of his mission all gravitated into the orbit of those events. 
In the three years he spent at the court he maintained constant relations with the sovereign 
and his entourage. Between the formation of the Holy League, the battle of Lepanto and 
the peace stipulated by Venice with the Ottoman Empire, without the knowledge of the 
“Confederates” Leonardo Donà exercised his diplomatic mission in an exemplary manner: 
he put the interests of the Serenissima before any personal considerations and, with pru-
dence and shrewdness, he was able to face the difficult mission of justifying to Philip II the 
peace reached between Venice and the Sublime Porte. The correspondence of the Venetian 
ambassador from Madrid addressed to the Venetian Senate is full of political considerations 
of high moral value, inspired by a high sense of duty towards the Signoria and, above all, 
guided by a refined knowledge of the art of diplomacy. Donà remained in Madrid until 
September 17th 1573.
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1. United and guaranteed with Philip II
In 1559 the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis defined the agreements 
that brought the conflict between the Habsburgs and France to an 
end. The treaty defined the new European balances and, moreover, 
highlighted the political weakness of the Italian states, recognizing 
an undisputed protagonism on the international political scene of the 
Habsburg dynasty, in its two branches, Spanish and Austrian. The 
Republic of Venice remained the only Italian political reality that 
managed to preserve relative autonomy thanks to its role in the Medi-
terranean and its ability to contain the Turk danger.  
However, faced with the leadership of the powerful Western Em-
pire1, the Serenissima could only diminish its role on the European 
1.Abbreviations: AGS = Archivo General de Simancas; E = Estado; L = Legajo; PR = Patronato 
Real; SAV = State Archives of Venice; MNL = Marciana National Library, Venice; ms = manus-
cript; r = recto; v = verso;  s = sheet; ss = sheets.
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Fernández Conti (eds.), 2005.
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stage, realizing the powerlessness «a fronteggiare da sola il colosso 
spagnolo e timorosa anche di giocare, contro l›invadente presenza 
della Spagna, le alleanze della Francia e della lontana Inghilterra» 
(Preto, 1987, p. 235). In that moment in history, Madrid was the 
centre of an “imperial system” (Elliott, 1982 e 2017; Musi, 2013) 
and –as claimed by Bennassar (2004, p. 16)– «sin ningún género 
de dudas, España es entonces, en el plano político y militar, una 
potencia mundial y solamente el Imperio otomano, su gran rival en 
el Mediterráneo, puede comparársele». While recognizing the ef-
fective role of Spain in the West (Galasso, 2004), Venice was not 
at all willing to end the relations with the Porte (Pingaro, 2018). 
Only when it became clear that the setting up of a powerful Turk-
ish fleet was actually needed to take possession of Cyprus (Orhonlu, 
1971, pp. 91-103; Hill, 1972; Gaziolu, 1990; Dündar, 2000, pp. 259-
274; Hadjidemetriou, 2002; Costantini, 2009; Korrè, 2015, pp. 197-
209)., did Venice begin to consider a possible alliance with Spain. 
The control of the geographical space on which the possessions of 
the Stato da Mar traditionally insisted was at stake. If in the West the 
Republic necessarily had to take the Spanish imperial complex into 
consideration, towards the East it continued to cultivate its relations 
with the Ottoman Porte, alternating, in an articulated and contra-
dictory framework, periods of war and peace with Constantinople 
and maintaining commercial and diplomatic relations with it.
When Selim II (1566-1574) resumed the project of expansion to-
wards the West with the intention of occupying Cyprus, Venice was 
unable to stop the Ottoman advance and Europe became aware, in 
the light of the unstoppable enemy offensive in the heart of the Medi-
terranean, of the necessity to intervene. «Per indebolire la potenza 
del Governo veneziano […] Selim II, imperatore de’ Turchi decise di 
conquistare l›isola di Cipro da quasi un secolo soggetta a Venezia ed 
avanguardia de’ suoi possessi in Levante» (Cogo, 1899, p. 4) starting a 
war that abruptly interrupted the peace between the two States.
The most authoritative historiographic observation (Cozzi, 1992, 
pp. 3-200) attributed the responsibility for the Cyprus War to the ex-
pansionist desire of Selim II and his powerful Jewish favourite Jossèf 
Nassì, considered by the Venetians the creator, to the detriment of the 
Republic, of an international network of spies. In reality, what was 
considered as a “declaration of war” sent to Venice on 28th March 
1570 by çavuş Kubad, who brought with him the ultimatum of the 
Sultan for the sale of Cyprus, concealed other reasons that pushed the 
Ottoman Empire towards the conflict. As Maria Pia Pedani stated, 
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the Empire showed signs of intolerance towards the Republic because 
it did not stop building castles and villages in Dalmatia, beyond the 
border lines of the territories that had been attributed to it by the 
previous peace agreements (Pedani, 1994, p. 162). 
Another instability factor was the regular use of the island of 
Cyprus by pirate ships as a base for supplies and for attacking the 
Ottoman ships in transit on the Alexandria-Constantinople route. 
«Secondo il pensiero ottomano, alla base del conflitto – clarifies Ped-
ani (2004, p. 288) – non vi erano dunque questioni personalistiche, 
bensì precise ragioni geo-politiche». If Cyprus had not been acquired 
by the Ottoman territorial heritage, therefore, it would have repre-
sented a persistent threat to the security of the Empire and the island 
would have turned into a logistical base of dangerous corsairs. Cy-
prus’s strategic position – and its status as a Christian énclave – made 
it more attractive to the Ottomans who, by conquering it, would have 
precluded the pirate ships the possibility of anchoring and supplying, 
thus ensuring safe navigation in the Mediterranean. In the area of the 
Mare Nostrum –especially in the second half of the 16th century– pi-
rate actions had become more and more audacious and the Christian 
fleets responded to this aggressiveness with equal military commit-
ment. The consequence of those raids and of those continuous clashes 
determined a progressive impoverishment of the populations and the 
cereal crisis enveloped the Mediterranean region. 
If since the Middle Ages the Near East had supplied Europe with 
its grains, in the second half of the sixteenth century «si ebbero una 
serie di proibizioni all›esportazione di tale prodotto da parte otto-
mana […] volte a privilegiare i rifornimenti interni ormai appena suf-
ficienti al fabbisogno locale» (Pedani, 2004, p. 288). In the Cyprus 
War, therefore, both geo-strategic and markedly economic reasons 
converged. And from this point of view, as it will be seen later, the Ot-
toman conquest of Cyprus forced Venice to turn elsewhere to secure 
the supplies of grains necessary for the Republic. The pretext used by 
Selim to start the real war with Venice came when Maltese pirates, ref-
ugees in the port of Cyprus, arrived in Venice «catturarono un carico 
di piastre, che da Alessandria veleggiava verso Costantinopoli», and 
the Sultan, on 13th January 1570, ordered «che tutte le navi veneziane 
che, per ragioni di commercio, si trovavano nell’isola, fossero seques-
trate, che l’ambasciatore Marcantonio Barbaro fosse arrestato e, quasi 
ciò non bastasse, permise ai corsari di molestare e di far preda in mare 
sulle galee di Venezia» (Cogo, 1899, pp. 4-5). 
The exhausting siege of Famagusta (22nd August 1570 - 4th Au-
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gust 1571) allowed the Turks to definitively take possession of the is-
land and foreshadowed in Europe a further advance of the “infidelsˮ 
in the Mediterranean. All this contributed to the awakening, in the 
West, of a renewed spirit of Christian crusade and to face the com-
mon enemy that ruled in the Mediterranean, a Holy League2 would 
bring together Venice and other smaller states (Malta with its knights, 
the Republic of Genoa, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duchy of 
Urbino, the Duchy of Parma, the Republic of Lucca, the Duchy of 
Ferrara, the Duchy of Mantua and the Duchy of Savoy) under the 
leadership of Philip II (Lieutenants, 1995, pp. 109-123; Kamen, 1997; 
Gattoni, 1999, pp. 611-650) and under the protective wing of Pope 
Pius V Ghislieri (1566-1572)3. The year before the League was offi-
cially constituted, the Spanish ambassador in Genoa, Diego Guzmán 
de Silva (1520-1577)4, on 8th February 1570, reporting to Philip II 
(Spagnoletti, 2018) on the Cyprus affair, supported the need to de-
fend the Venetian cause and, possibly, to establish a concrete alliance 
with the Republic. From a conversation held in Genoa with the «hijo 
del Consul de Veneçia que está en esta ciudad» (AGS, E, L, 1399, s. 1 
r), the Spanish diplomat received information coming from Constan-
tinople, according to which
se dezia que en breve vendria otro Chauz a pedirles aquella Isla. […] Y 
alargandose en la platica mas comigo, me vino a tocar en que seria cosa 
que estaria muy bien a su Republica hazer estrecha liga con Vuestra Ma-
jestad para contra este enemigo […]. Y que tenia por cierto, que quando 
se propusi ese a Vuestra Majestad les mostraria el afiçion, que tiene a sus 
cosas en particular y al bíen comun dela Christiandad, aconsejandole, que 
si se oviese de tratar dello en algun tiempo, que quanto mas presto fuese 
seria mejor. Bien creo, que si los apretase el Turco vendrian por sus fines 
en algun medio (AGS, E, L, 1399, s. 1 r-v). 
As a result of what was happening in the Mediterranean, Venice 
was forced to reconsider the prerogatives that over time had made it 
the protagonist of a diplomacy swinging between the image of privi-
leged partner of the Porte and, at the same time, bulwark of Western 
2. AGS, PR, L. 17, Capitulación de la Santa Liga contra la armada del Turco, ss. 50-59. Specific 
aspects of the agreement between the “confederati” are dealt with in the two volumes of Serrano, 
1918-1919.
3. Guasco, Torre (eds.), 2005; Gattoni, 2006; Cervini, Spantigati (eds.), 2006; for a general over-
view of the scene in which the Pope acted, see Prosperi, 1986, pp. 175-211.
4. On diplomatic functions, the nature of ambassadors and the role of courts in the early Modern 
Age, Mattingly, 1955, pp. 209-295. About the Spanish Ambassadors, Levin, 2005.
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Christianity. Finally, in 1571, the Signoria entered the Holy League. 
From that moment on, despite the commercial past and the preferen-
tial economic relations with Constantinople, a political strategy began 
to emerge: this favoured both the emergence of a wide range of com-
monplaces on the Ottoman world and the dissemination of news con-
cerning the spectre of Turk danger to Western Christianity. It was a 
precise political plan that took concrete form primarily in the change 
in relations between Venice and the Sublime Porte, favouring the con-
tingencies that forced the Serenissima Republic to come closer to the 
united Western powers and guaranteed by Philip II. The change in 
strategy was clarified, moreover, in a passage from the Report read in 
the Venetian Senate in February 1571 by Sigismondo Cavalli (1530-
1579), Ambassador of the Republic to the Spanish Sovereign from 
1566 to 1569:
dirò di aver compreso che il re si trova assai ben soddisfatto di questa 
Serenissima Repubblica, poiché vede che tutte le sue azioni sono piene di 
rispetto e riverenza verso di lui, e che il proceder che usa Vostra Serenità5 
non va a cammino di dar disturbo o impedimento aʼ suoi pensieri. Vero è 
che stava con qualche ombra, e gli dispiaceva la bontà ed amicizia che lui 
credeva che sʼavesse coi Turchi, parendogli che di loro si facesse più stima 
che di tutti i principi cristiani insieme e che con troppa intrinsichezza si 
conservasse la pace che con quelli s’aveva. Per il che ho dovuto usare con 
Sua Maestà, ma più con i ministri, diversi ufficj […] per giustificar questo 
fatto e farli capaci dei rispetti che movevano Vostra Serenità ad usar aʼ 
Turchi qualche apparente dimostrazione, per causa della loro gran poten-
za e dei molti e lunghi confini che seco sʼavea, e non per buona volontà 
che lor fosse portata; e che quando fosse stato tempo, questo Stato averia 
mostrato che animo veramente teneva verso loro, e quanto era pronto al 
servizio di Dio e al beneficio della cristianità6. 
With the inclusion in the Holy League, any doubt regarding the fi-
delity of Venice to the Christian cause seemed to have been dispelled. 
But even before the Republic joined the League, the ties between 
the lagoon city and Constantinople were controversial. On 24th May 
1570, exactly one year before the agreements of the Holy League were 
sanctioned, Guzmán de Silva wrote to Philip II addressing the per-
plexities raised both by Guidobaldo II Della Rovere (1514-1574) and 
5. Alvise I Mocenigo (1570-1577), successor of Pietro Loredan (1567-1570) since May 1570. 
6. «Relazione di Spagna di Sigismondo Cavalli. 1570», in Albèri, 1861, pp. 190-191. 
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by Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle (1517-1586)7 about the 
reliability of Venice’s involvement in the Christian blockade against 
the Turk:
El Duque de Urbino me escriviò a los 18 deste, que avia alguna opinion o 
esperança que se podrian venecianos acordar con el Turco, el qual habia 
començado a tratar bien su Baylo, y a dar libertad a los mercadores y a 
sus mercançias, los quales antes detenidos, y que pareçia, que el Rey de 
Francia se queria meter por medio a hazer esta concordia, y que se avia 
offrecido a ello, que seria ocasion, de hazer los entrar en alguna espe-
rança, pero que todavia no dexavan de armar con toda diligençia, estando 
atentos a las provisiones necessarias para la guerra. Este mesmo aviso del 
Duque de Urbino me escrive el Cardinal de Granvela, que le davan de 
Venecia, y que el Embaxador del Rey de Francia avia offrecido, que su 
Rey se meteria por medio de buena gana para concertar con el Turco, 
pero que entendía, que habia quedado descontentos deste officio, que el 
embaxador hazia (AGS, E, L 1399, 48, s. 99). 
Although the alliances were defined between 1570 and 1571, it 
was by no means certain that Venice would interrupt its relations with 
Constantinople. The French mediation, too, appeared to be worrying 
«para concertar con el Turco» so much so that Guzmán de Silva sent 
to his Sovereign an encrypted assertion which, when interpreted, was 
equivalent to «es de creer que ninguna ocasión perderán franceses por 
hacer más» (AGS, E, L 1399, 48, s. 99), clarifying that France would 
not spare aid to the Ottoman Empire8. However, the pact concluded 
by the Holy League to confront the Turk danger, as it is known, bore 
fruit on 7th October 1571 in Lepanto9 where Don John of Austria 
(1547-1578), Philip II’s brother, in command of the Christian fleet, 
inflicted a heavy defeat on the Ottoman Empire, which lost more than 
thirty thousand men, was deprived of more than a hundred ships and 
saw about twelve thousand Christian slaves released. As Braudel said, 
in Lepanto «l’incanto della potenza turca fu infranto» (Braudel, 1976, 
p. 1166). Venice was informed in this way of the outcome of the battle:
7.The diplomatic correspondence of the cardinal was collected, at the end of the 19th century, in 
a ponderous work edited by Piot and Poullet, 1887-1896. On the role of the cardinal in Spanish 
politics see Legnani, 2013; and Musi, 2013, pp. 67 and following.
8. Braudel, 19762, «Il fattore diplomatico francese», vol. II, pp. 1170-1174. 
9. The literature on the Battle of Lepanto is very extensive. It has been the object of numerous 
publications, from the initial “accounts” and “reports” published soon after the event to the lat-
est research. Among the many volumes dedicated to the memorable battle, see Beeching, 1982; 
Canosa, 2000; H. Bicheno, 2003; Rivero Rodriguez, 2008; Barbero, 2010; Capponi, 2010.
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La nova della Vittoria, ottenuta ai Curzolari sotto li VII del sopradetto 
mese di Ottobre 1571 contra Turchi, fu portata dal Magnifico Onfrè Gius-
tiniano Governator di Galea il giorno XIX di detto mese, il quale giunto 
nel porto di Venezia, et dentro de i lidi fece sparando tutta l’artellaria, et 
suonando molti strumenti, segno di suprema allegrezza, havendo anco 
fatto vestir, e soldati, e officiali, e galeoti delle spoglie, ei parava la galea 
dell’armi, et insegne de’ nemici, strassinando molte di esse bandiere per 
acqua10.
Being informed of the «gran vittoria», the «gran numero di Popolo 
che era corso alle rive» was taken by «gran meraviglia» and «conso-
lazione» (SAV, Collegio, Cerimoniale, sec. XVI-1797, I, ss. XLI). The 
Venetian Senate, in an atmosphere of general euphoria, established 
the ways to celebrate the event. On 19th October 1571, in fact, the 
constitutional organ of the Republic deliberated that 
niuna cosa più conviene al Principe veramente Christiano, che il riconos-
cer dalla omnipossentissima mano del Signor Dio ogni vittoria, et felicità, 
et perciò in spiritu humilitatis, et in corde contrito deve render gratie a 
sua divina Maestà, et se in alcun tempo è stato conveniente far questo, è 
si presente, che l’infinita misericordia del Signor Dio si è degnata donar 
alla Christianità, et particularmente alla Repubblica nostra, così segnalata 
vittoria pero dovendosi far quelle demostrationi, che in così importante 
occasione sono debite11.
The enthusiasm for the victory had pervaded the Christian spirit of 
Venice and, at that point, the Senate recognized Philip II’s undisputed 
role as leader and defender of the Christian West against the “infidel” 
enemy. The Patriarch of Venice John Trevisan (1560-1590) should 
have ordered «a tutti li Piovani delle Contrade di questa città, et alli 
monasterij de frati, et Monache, che debbano far oratione al signor 
Dio ringratiando sua divina Maestà de così segnalata vittoria, facendo 
publiche processioni il Mercore, Venere, et Sabato della Settimana 
futura, et la Domenica sussequente» (SAV, Collegio, Cerimoniale, cit., 
s. XL r) also encouraging the people to follow the religious services as 
 
10. SAV, Collegio, Cerimoniale, sec. XVI-1797, I, ss. XL-XLI, Come capitò in questa città la nova 
della vittoria contra Turchi, et molti altri particolari, s. XL v. About the Venetial Ceremonial, see 
Casini, 1997, pp. 107-160.
11. SAV, Collegio, Cerimoniale, sec. XVI-1797, I, Ordine di far processione per la vittoria havuta 
contra Turchi et che si vada ogn’anno a 7 d’ottobre a Santa Giustina, M. D. LXXI Die XIX Ottobre 
in Pregadi, s. XL r.
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a sign of gratitude. Guzmán de Silva –who had come from Genoa to 
Venice12– took part in the solemn celebrations in San Marco, where 
al serenissimo Principe Alvise Mocenigo presentate le lettere dell’Ill. mo 
General Veniero et nonciata la ricevuta gratia del sommo Eterno Dio, 
diede Sua Serenità subito ordine che fussero suonate le campane di San 
Marco di alegrezza; et nel tempo medesimo con l’Eccellentissimo Colle-
gio discese alla Chiesa di San Marco; nella quale giunse poco dapoi il Re-
verendissimo Signor Don Diego Guzman, Ambasciator della Maestà del 
Re Catolico, et fu dalla sua sublimità, et da detto Reverendissimo Ambas-
ciatore intonato il TE DEUM (SAV, Collegio, Cerimoniale, cit., s. XLI r).
The celebrations continued for several days, always in the presence 
of the Spanish ambassador who, representing his King, used the same 
gestures and «s’entoure du même apparat» (Bély, 2007, p. 52) to dem-
onstrate the power of his State and to receive the honours attributed 
to Spain for the naval victory of Lepanto, in the general celebration, 
among the highest city authorities and the conspicuous popular par-
ticipation13. In the 16th century, in fact, the importance of the figure 
and role of the ambassador took on considerable relevance as an ex-
pression of sovereign power and, starting with the volume De officio 
Legati by Étienne Dolet published in Lyon in 1541, started a tradition 
of writings that proposed a series of “guides” to practice the art of di-
plomacy. The model that emerged from the pen of Dolet –educated in 
Padua, in close contact with some of the major protagonists of the Re-
naissance including Bembo, Pomponazzi and Pole– was a reworking 
of the author’s personal experience as secretary of the Venetian lega-
tion of Jean de Langeac. Despite the fact that the work was pervaded 
by an inevitable clientelary rhetoric about some of his contemporary 
ambassadors, Dolet’s considerations constituted the key to humanistic 
culture in which a circumscribed pedagogical design contributed «alla 
definizione, entro la sfera politica, di precise identità professionali 
ancorate alla gestione del discorso, scritto e orale, pubblico e can-
celleresco, cortigiano e propagandistico» (Frigo, 2015, p. 236). The 
arts of oratory and rhetoric were placed at the service of power by 
12.The appointment as ambassador to Venice had already been issued by the Secretary of State 
Antonio Pérez in  Madrid on 26 November 1569 (AGS, E, L 1398, 267, s. 508) but in the mean-
time de Silva had remained in Genoa waiting for the new envoy to arrive. Doge Alvise I Mocenigo 
had received communications from Madrid about the new Spanish resident (AGS, E, L 1401, 
267, s. 532). 
13.On Venetian rituals, on the dynamics of identity deriving from the celebratory representations 
in the city space and «based upon a broad consensus about social values», Muir, 1981, p. 5.
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men of letters to strengthen the qualities of their office and to qualify 
the effectiveness of their political action. If the mission of the perfect 
ambassador consisted in promoting, moving, advocating for causes, 
attending public celebrations, in Venice Guzmán de Silva exercised 
his office to perfection: 
Alli XXI andò il Principe con la Signoria, et con l’Ambasciatore del 
Principe in Chiesa dove si celebrò la messa del Spirito Santo, cantata dal 
Reverendissimo Ambasciatore della Catolica Maestà, et fu fatta una solen-
nissima processione d’intorno alla Piazza con il corpo di Nostro Signore, 
portato inanzi a sua Signoria sotto l’ombrela del sopradetto Reverendissi-
mo Ambasciatore (SAV, Collegio, Cerimoniale, cit., s. XLI r).
Venice was celebrating a renewed Christian harmony and a part-
nership with Philip II, who would soon begin to show the first signs 
of weakness, as will be seen later, a clear indication of the changed po-
litical and economic strategies of the Serenissima Republic. However, 
the victory over the Turks had invigorated the spirits and, initially, 
it seemed that the dream of an Ottoman thalassocracy had died in 
Lepanto. So, immediately after the «gran vittoria», a general sense 
of satisfaction reigned in the city and the Doge led the ceremonial 
prepared to seal the triumph over the Turk. Once again «alli XXVIII 
discese il Ser. mo Principe, et Ill. ma Signoria con gli Ambasciatori alla 
Chiesa [di San Marco] dove cantata la messa dal sopradetto Rever-
endissimo Don Diego Guzman de Silva, si communicò sua Sig. ria et 
tutto il Senato, referendo gratie a Dio di tanto gran bene» (SAV, Col-
legio, Cerimoniale, cit., s. XLI r).
And to reward those who had committed themselves to fighting 
in the waters of the Korcula «fu alli II di Novembre sussequenti per 
parte di Senato creato Cavaliero il sopradetto Magnifico Giustinia-
no, et fattogli dono di una catena di oro di valore de scudi trecento» 
(SAV, Collegio, Cerimoniale, cit., s. XLI r). To those who had fallen 
in battle, moreover, Paolo Paruta (1540-1598) «interprete intelligente 
e brillante delle tradizioni della nobiltà veneziana» (Preto, 20132, p. 
180), dedicated an intense funeral oration. The work, containing cel-
ebratory motifs that exalted Venetian courage and virtues, marked 
the literary debut of the author –to whom we will return later– and 
recognizing the strength and power of the Turks in battle, exalted 
the value of the Venetians. With patriotic pride, Paruta affirmed that 
«non hanno combattuto i nostri con alcuna vil nazione, usa a non 
sostener pur l›aspetto del nimico […] ma con uomini ferocissimi e 
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bellicosissimi, quali i Turchi sono, di nome dianzi così terribile e di 
forze invitte»14. 
The Venetian patrician Leonardo Donà (or Donato, 1536-1612) –
future doge of the Republic from 1606 until his death– who also came 
from the most cultured elite and, like all Venetian diplomatic repre-
sentatives was «impregnati di cultura umanistica»15 (Valensi, 1989, p. 
25), was appointed ambassador to the Court of Philip II – succeeding 
Sigismondo Cavalli– on 29th July 1569, taking charge of the office and 
presenting his credentials to Philip II on 25th May 1570 (Brunetti e 
Vitale, 1963, p. XXIV). 
The period of Donà’s ambassadorship coincided exactly with the 
years of the Cyprus War and the circumstances of his mission all gravi-
tated in the orbit of that event. The Venetian ambassador remained 
at the Court of Philip II until 17th September 1573, when he left the 
Sovereign together with the extraordinary ambassador Giovanni 
Soranzo, sent to Spain by the Serenissima Republic to present the 
“excuses” of the Republic after the peace stipulated with the Turk in 
1573. The circumstances were truly extraordinary and required the 
permanence at court of both Donà and Lorenzo Priuli (1538-1600) 
–Donà’s successor, who arrived in Madrid on 27th November 1572– 
and the presence of Soranzo in order to conclude the problematic 
diplomatic question that arose after the conclusion of the Ottoman-
Venetian peace. The role played by Donà in Spain –a leading political 
observer in sixteenth-century Europe– was undoubtedly important 
and took place in conjunction with significant historical events. If the 
questions concerning the Holy League -in its diplomatic, strategic and 
logistical aspects– were addressed and resolved by the Spanish, Ve-
netian and Pontifical ambassadors and envoys congregated in Rome 
since June 1570 to stipulate the Capitulations, Donà had to deal with 
«compiti delicati ed anche di gran peso connessi allo sviluppo della 
vicenda della Lega» (Brunetti e Vitale, 1963, p. XXV). Fernand Brau-
del (Avant-propos in Brunetti e Vitale p. XI) wrote to the Venetian 
ambassador «entre dans sa trente-quatrième année quand il prend ef-
fectivement sur ses épaules […] la lourde charge de représenter la 
République auprès de Philippe II» and the awareness of the difficult 
task connected to the uncertainty of the times probably persuaded 
him that «au milieu de sa vie, il ne pas plus assuré de son brillant 
avenir personnel que la Seigneurie elle-même ne l›est de sa fortune». 
14. Paruta, «Orazione funebre. In laude de’ morti alle Curzolari», in Monzani, 1852, p. 26.
15. On the cultural background of Donà, see the contribution, now a classic, by Seneca, 1959. 
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Donà had to deal, as it could often happen to ambassadors residing 
in foreign courts, with an environment which was not necessarily 
friendly and clear where –continues Braudel– «le Roi est “prudent”, 
courtois, énigmatique; ses “ministres” sont prudents comme lui, lents, 
énigmatiques, comme lui» (Braudel, Avant-propos in Brunetti e Vitale, 
p.XV). The diplomatic mission required to «connaître ces hommes, 
s›acharner à les deviner, à les considerer comme des acteurs agissant 
et libres, à retourner leurs cartes truquée, c›est rechercher, sinon re-
trouver toujours la réel, le tangible, le vrai» (Braudel, Avant-propos in 
Brunetti e Vitale p.XV), thus fulfilling the precepts of diplomatic art. 
Donà’s diplomatic action at the Spanish Court was unrelenting and 
from his arrival in 1570 he supervised to accelerate the expedition of 
the Spanish galleys of Giovanni Andrea Doria (1539-1606) (Savelli, 
1992, pp. 361-375), or to solicit the mediation of Philip II so that the 
Emperor Maximilian of Hapsburg would join the League, or to define 
the controversial points of the Treaty that was being written in Rome 
among the Christian powers.
He also tried to mediate on the granting of “routes” or export 
licenses for grains –as iwill be seen below– from the Kingdom of Na-
ples in favour of the Venetian army. As it can be imagined, these were 
issues of the utmost importance and in that historical moment the 
Court of Philip II represented the place where strategic decisions on 
the future of the political-international structures were made (Musi, 
2013, pp. 99-127). 
When the news of the victory of Lepanto reached Madrid, the 
union of the Christian forces appeared to be very successful both in 
the eyes of the Venetian resident and in the circles of the Court. On 2nd 
November Donà wrote to Doge Mocenigo from the Spanish capital:
La nova della gloriosissima vittoria, che dalla benigna mano di Dio è sta-
ta concessa a tutta la cristianità, et in particolare così abbondantemente 
alla Serenità Vostra, e che a lej è piaciuto d’inviarmj […] mi arrivò qui 
all’ultimo del mese passato, due ore dopo il mezzo giorno la prima notte 
della quale, così come mi riempì subito di giocondissima allegrezza, così 
mi fece ancora molto ben riconoscere che l’abbondantia della pietà di 
Dio, verso di noi, eccede non solamente i nostri meritj, ma insieme an-
chora le nostre medesime speranze. Onde non sapend’io, ne potendo in 
alcun’altra maniera renderli qualche poco di gratie, prostratomj subito 
con la faccia, e con la bocca per terra, laudai, benedissi e fortificaj con 
ogni humiltà la Divina, et inenarrabile sua misericordia (SAV, Archivi pro-
pri degli Ambasciatori, Spagna, 6, s. 104 r).
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On the same day Donà asked the King for an audience via the 
butler of the Court Pedro Fernández de Cabrera y Bobadilla Count 
of Chinchón and «piacque a Sua Maestà d›annettermj dentro delle 
Cortine del suo baldacchino et d›odirmj» (SAV, Archivi propri degli 
Ambasciatori, Spagna, 6, s. 104 r.) to describe to him the details of the 
victory and to share the “joy” for the common triumph. The satisfac-
tion with the result obtained in Lepanto made Philip appear as the 
champion of Western Christianity –along with Pius V– but this did 
not exclude that the benefits of success were also reaped by the other 
States gathered under the banner of the Holy League and Venice was 
attributed an indisputable protagonism. Ambassador Donà recog-
nized the clear signs of Spanish gratitude to the Republic in the “fa-
miliarity” granted to him by Philip, who wanted to recite the prayers 
«insieme con me […] laudando la bontà di Dio di tanto favore, e 
rendendo infinite gratie alla Serenità Vostra di questo preclarissimo 
aviso e poi mi disse che il Te Deum non solamente voleva che lo di-
cessimo insieme ma che tutta la Capella anchora solennissimamente 
lo decantasse» (SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, Spagna, 6, s. 
104 v). And to emphasize even more the high esteem he had for the 
King, Leonardo Donà added that «accompagnai Sua Maestà dentro 
le sue stantie ragionando sempre di questo buon successo, e mi fermai 
etiam con lej fin’alla notte oscura, con molto suo piacere» (SAV, Ar-
chivi propri degli Ambasciatori, Spagna, 6, s. 104 v). 
Venice and Madrid seemed to be united by an authentic bond 
of collaboration that on the one hand was skilfully described by the 
diplomatic language and on the other hand manifested itself in the 
courtly formalities exhibited by Philip II, in an effective and strategic 
game of the parties. Taking advantage of the relaxed climate and the 
«vivo calore […] nel quale mi haveva posto la notitia di questa cele-
berrima fatione» that «mi suministrava molto vigore» (ASV, Archivi 
propri degli Ambasciatori, Madrid Alli 4 di Novembre 1571, s. 105 r), 
the ambassador was allowed to express
a Sua Maestà con tutta la mia efficacia possibile, per eccitarla a conoscere, 
a bene usare quella gratia, che la misericordia di Dio ci ha concessa, ricor-
dandoli che le più grate laudi, e le più gioconde gratie, che si possono dare 
a Dio, saranno il proseguir la vittoria con tutto il sforzo del suo potere, e 
caminar dietro quel gran lume, che la bontà di Dio inaspettatamente si ha 
degnato di mostrarcj per debellare l’Inimico (ASV, Archivi propri degli 
Ambasciatori, Madrid Alli 4 di Novembre 1571, s. 105 r).
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Venice, therefore, at that time was determined to keep the com-
mitments made with the League and, resorting to the rhetoric of the 
common Muslim enemy to be fought under the auspices of the “di-
vine grace”, considered it appropriate to secure the powerful friend-
ship with Philip II. The Republic, “united” in the Holy League, did 
not ignore the Habsburg supremacy in the Western Mediterranean 
and knew well that the “construction” of the sea route (Pacini, 2013), 
begun with Charles V and continued by Philip II, allowed Spain to 
excel politically and militarily on the European political scene of the 
sixteenth century. Donà had good reasons to please the Signoria, since 
the King seemed grateful to the Republic and declared his intention 
to maintain friendly and lasting relations with it. The ambassador re-
ported that 
Sua Maestà mi rispose, che ella conosceva molto bene, che tutto quello 
ch’io le havea detto, era verissimo, e che poiché a Dio è piaciuto di farci 
un beneficio tanto singulare, intendeva l’obbligo suo essere di riconos-
cerlo, e di seguitare questa cristiana vittoria, con tutte le forze. Onde mi 
prometteva con ogni certezza, che dal canto suo farà tutto quel più, che 
le sarà possibile, e laudava grandemente la Serenità Vostra della buona, 
e prudente intentione che ha di non lasciare rifar l’Inimico, ma di pro-
seguire questo prospero corso in ognj vigore (SAV, Archivi propri degli 
Ambasciatori, cit., Madrid Alli 4 di Novembre 1571, s. 105 r - 105 v).
Venice, therefore, evoking the defense of Christianity and the de-
feat of the common enemy, considered inevitable –right after Lepan-
to– to ensure the availability of Philip II. Although at that time Spain’s 
willingness to support Venice seemed real16, the Serenissima would 
not have waited long to change its plans and, pragmatically evaluating 
the circumstances, would decide to move closer to the Porte.
After Lepanto, however, the art of Venetian diplomacy (Preto, 
1998, pp. 151-166) took the field in Madrid and with all the skills 
of eloquence and oratory, Donà tried to protect the interests of the 
Republic and, capturing the favour of the Spanish Sovereign, he had 
the response: «Io stimo Ambasciatore grandemente l›amore che mi 
porta la Signoria, e spero che, così come siamo congionti in questa oc-
casione, così ancora saremo in tutte le altre» (SAV, Archivi propri de-
gli Ambasciatori, cit., Di Madrid, Alli 4 di Novembre 1571, s. 105 v).
16. The ambassador said: «nell’espressione che Sua Maestà mi fece di quella sua volontà, vera-
mente che a me parve, che ella parlasse col Cuore, e con più asseverantia di quello, che ella mi 
habbia alcun’altra volta fatto», SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, cit., s. 105 v.
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What better opportunity to plead the cause of Venice’s inability 
to obtain grain supplies from the East as a result of the war and in 
distress at the shortage of cereals? For this reason, in addition to the 
enthusiastic tones of circumstance for the achieved naval victory in 
Lepanto, Donà appealed to Philip II to favour the supply of grain to 
Venice:
Nella materia della tratta de granj esposi a Sua Maestà tutto quello che 
la Serenità Vostra mi scriveva […] e le dissi apertamente che senza la co-
modità delli granj, impossibil cosa sarebbe alla Serenità Vostra attendere 
a questa espeditione, che il bisogno delli viveri, e la fame non patiscono 
dilatione alcuna, che dal mancamento di essi conveniria necessariamente 
nascere ogni sorta di confusione. Onde la pregava a remediare con ordinj 
chiari e presti, che siano senza cavillationj obbeditj, et il bisogno di Vostra 
Serenità sostenuto (SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, cit., Di Ma-
drid, Alli 4 di Novembre 1571, ss. 105 v. 106 r).
The Sovereign reassured the Signoria that the provision of grain 
would be possible in Sicily and in the Kingdom of Naples and, ac-
cording to the agreements reached in the capitulations of the League, 
Venice would not lack the support of Spain. On 6th November, Donà 
addressed Philip II once again and considered it certain that the 
Sovereign would have honoured the «negotio» relating to the sup-
ply of cereals and the general subject matter of the «tratta dei granj 
dalli suoi Regni di Sicilia, e di Napoli», certain that «ella haverà dato 
sufficiente comissione per questo bisogno». The Venetian ambas-
sador communicated to the Sovereign the need of the Signoria to as 
rapidly as possible overcome the granary shortages that impended 
the Republic, as «si tratta della maggiore importantia di tutte le cose, 
che la Serenissima Signoria mi comette e raccomanda questo negotio 
con un’efficacia inestimabile» and only because of the seriousness 
of the situation «io convengo ritornare a pregare vostra Maestà, che 
si degnj darmi espeditione tale che i miej Signori restino sodisfattj, 
e li ministrj di Vostra Maestà non habbino causa di metter diffi-
cultà alcuna in liberamente concederle» (SAV, Archivi propri degli 
Ambasciatori, Donà a S. R. C. M., Di Madrid Alli 6 di Novembre 
1571, s. 107 r). And in order to attribute the most absolute licitness 
to the request, Lorenzo Donà did not hesitate to recall what was 
established by the agreements between the states coalesced in the 
League and, on the basis of the most formal reasons, he declared 
that «la Capitolatione della Legha è tanto chiara, che non ha bisogno 
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d’interpretatione alcuna, e quello che si domanda, tutto è per comun 
beneficio dell’Impresa, e per sostentatione della nostra militia, e li 
granj si portano ove la Signoria ha maggior comodità di poterli ridu-
rre in biscottj» (SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, Donà a S. 
R. C. M., Di Madrid Alli 6 di Novembre 1571, s. 107 r). An utterly 
sober way to claim support for the troops at a time when the costs of 
war also affected the food supplies available to the State. Even the 
King knew very well that «la fame […] non ha riparo alcuno, e senza 
li granj non solamente potremo dal canto nostro proseguir insieme 
con Vostra Maestà la Vittoria come si conviene, e come sommamente 
desideriamo, ma tutte le cose riceverano singular nocumento» (SAV, 
Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, Donà a S. R. C. M., Di Madrid 
Alli 6 di Novembre 1571, ss. 107 r - 107v).
On Christmas Day 1571, an occasion which that year acquired an 
even more meaningful connotation for the Christian “federated”, the 
Venetian legacy reiterated to the King of Spain the intention of the 
Serenissima to pursue the interests of the League alongside all the “al-
lies” submitting to his will:
Io certo non posso negare, che il comodo proprio della mia Patria non 
mi stia sempre nel Cuore, ma […] non è minore ancora il desiderio, ch’io 
ho del ben comune di tutti li Christianj […] dopo che quella perversa 
Casa Ottomana tiraneggia nel Mondo, il Signor Dio appresentò occasione 
più bella, che la presente […] Vostra Maestà è hoggi dì il specchio, e 
l’essempio della bontà, e della vera religione del Mondo (SAV, Archivi 
propri degli Ambasciatori, Da Madrid il dì della Natività di N. S. 1571, 
s. 116 r).
For another year, the Venetian diplomacy would have expressed 
itself in the same tones and had not intimated, at least formally, the 
intentions of re-stitching relations with the Sublime Porte. The “in-
trigues” of diplomacy advised caution (Andretta, 2006) and prudence 
and the Lordship would put its interests –political and economic– be-
fore any obligation assumed in other places.
2. Men by the King, men of the King
On 1st May 1572, at the death of Pope Pius V, intransigent theo-
logian, inquisitor and promoter of the Counter-Reformation, the 
League remained orphaned of its spiritual supporter and was head-
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ing towards an inexorable rift. Venetian and Spanish interests clearly 
differed, as it has been said many times, and Gregory XIII Boncom-
pagni (on the Chair of Peter from 1572 to 1585)17, while continuing 
the action of his predecessor and showing a firm will to promote the 
anti-Turk coalition, failed in the intent to keep alive the Holy League, 
formed in 1570, and –despite the political and diplomatic efforts– its 
final demise had to be accepted (Tamborra, 1961). 
Fernand Braudel stated that the «treason» by Venice –that is the 
end of the treaty of peace with the Porte– took place on 7th March 
1573. More than betrayal, it is preferable to speak, says the author, 
of the Venetian «desertion» of the union established in Rome be-
tween the Christian federated states against the Turk. In the period 
in which Venice was involved in the war in Cyprus, the situation of 
the Republic was characterized by disorganization «nel commercio, 
nelle industrie, nelle finanze, sfinita dalla guerra marittima, costosa 
più di ogni altra, torturata nella vita quotidiana dalla rarità e dal caro 
prezzo dei viveri […] e le ditte dei ricchi veneziani non potevano 
contentarsi di un commercio indiretto con la Turchia» (Braudel, 
19762, vol II, p. 1206).
The war that had been going on for three years had not brought 
any substantial profit to the Republic (Brunetti, 1958, vol. II, pp. 145-
156). If anything, it had suffered heavy losses, from the island of Cy-
prus as early as 1571, to a series of strategic outposts in the Adriatic 
territories. Thus, the discontent due to the heavy economic losses re-
sulting from the current war, the divergence of interests with Spain, 
the need to maintain its independence from the Spanish yoke –which 
politically dominated much of the Italian peninsula– induced Venice 
to resume the preferential dialogue with the Ottoman Levant. With-
out foretelling the allies of the League’s exit and the intention to sign 
a separate peace with the Turk –as established by the Roman agree-
ments– the Serenissima acted in the conviction that it had done well, 
to the benefit of the State. 
The news of the Peace between Venice and Costantinople «di-
ventò argomento capitale di discussione, e il principio, che “il minor 
male è spezie di bene”, autorizzava a considerare la pace con il Turco 
[…] un male per Venezia e per la cristianità minore che la perdita di 
Candia e dell’Adriatico» (Cessi, 1946, vol. II, p. 128). An expected 
separation between Venice and the League implied for the Lordship 
17. About the relations between the Court of Madrid and the Holy See during the pontificate of 
Boncompagni, see Fernandez Collado, 1991.
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the rethinking of its role in the political and international order of the 
European States. And what better place to have the measure of the 
political climate after the signing of the peace than the Court of Philip 
II, where Donà continued to carry out his diplomatic mission? A di-
rect relationship with the centre of Spanish politics, in the presence 
of the Sovereign who in the West held the leadership of international 
politics18: and precisely for these reasons the function of Donà took 
on a very different aspect when he was invited to provide answers, 
together with Lorenzo Priuli, on the question of the “talked-about” 
peace between the Signoria and the Porte. A very delicate, if not com-
plex and arduous task.
The news of the peace had arrived in Madrid on 17th April 1573:
Il corriero espeditoci dalla Serenità vostra con l’aviso inaspettatissimo qui 
a questo tempo della conclusione della pace, arrivò hoggi 17 del mese due 
hore inantj al mezzo giorno. Et noi, così per obbedire alla Serenità Vostra, 
che ci comette presta esecutione, come perché ci parve, per ogni honesto 
rispetto, esser bene, che Sua Maestà ne havesse da noi immediata notitia, 
le facessimo subito domandare l’audientia […] et ella fece rispondere non 
esser possibile admetterci hoggi […] ma che comunicassimo, se così ci pa-
reva, con alcuno delli suoi Ministrj, e che domattina poi ella procurerebbe 
d’odircij (SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, Spagna, 6, s. 161 r).
The aviso of the regained peace reached Madrid inaspettatissimo, 
the result of a decision taken in the “Homeland” and about which 
the Donà should have talked to Philip II. The postponement of the 
audience to the following morning presumably clashed with the need 
felt by Leonardo Donà to confer promptly with the Sovereign. This 
is especially true when taking into account the fact that the Venetian 
ambassador was «assolutamente contrario al modo di operare della 
Repubblica» (Brunetti e Vitale, 1963, vol. I, p. XLIV) and in open op-
position both to the work of the Council of Ten (Macchi, 1864) and, 
in general, to the executive group that had promoted and deliberated 
the peace negotiations. The fracture that was to become evident at the 
end of the 16th century between two opposing political tendencies 
within the Venetian ruling class was beginning to appear. Between 
exponents of the city patriciate «vecchi» (for example Paolo Tiepolo) 
and «nuovi» (Donà or Nicolò da Ponte, to name a few) (Andretta, 
2017, pp. 176-196) there was the political dialectic about the role that 
18. On his political strategies, Galasso, 1995, pp. 13-40; Anatra, Manconi (eds.), 1999. 
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the Republic should play in the Italian and Mediterranean scene. A 
“generation clash” –as Gaetano Cozzi (1958, pp. 1-52) pointed out– 
was materializing between two different political positions, between 
the old and the new guard: the first tending towards the conservation 
and custody of political and religious orthodoxy that favoured align-
ment with Spanish politics; the second tending to curb the interfer-
ence of rigid Spanish politics and to favour, instead, a rapprochement 
with France, both from the economic point of view and from the reli-
gious point of view (Preto, 1987, pp. 241- 242; id, 1994, pp. 215-238).
The political biography of Donà, his election to doge in 1606, 
also represented the crowning of the political choices that, in the 
twilight of the sixteenth century, had imposed themselves in the 
Venetian aristocracy19. In the peace negotiations of 1573, as Eligio 
Vitale stated, on the basis of a careful analysis of the sources, there 
seems to be no doubt that they were the result of the choices made 
by the Council of Ten, which ipso facto attributed paternity to them 
and that the management of the war, from the earliest stages, was 
always firmly entrusted to the decision-making power of the Ten 
(Brunetti and Vitale, vol. I, pp. XLV and following). At the Spanish 
Court, therefore, Donà, despite himself, had to try with the weapons 
of diplomacy to put forward the most sensible reasons to justify the 
peace just concluded with the Turk. Alongside the reasons he offi-
cially proposed for “justifying” Venice, the Ambassador explained, 
with feelings of lively participation, the «christiane» virtues, the civil 
and military merits, the commitment of the State, the sacrifice of 
many to enable the Republic to observe the precepts of the League 
and the devotion to the allies:
Presentatici adunque a Sua Maestà et fatta una modesta scusa della so-
llecitudine nostra con l’importantia di quello che havevamo a dirle, e che 
ben’era che ella presto sapesse, le dicessimo che dalla maniera con la qua-
le la Serenità Vostra haveva fatto la guerra al Turco di continuo per li tre 
anni passatj, et dall’augumento delle forze che ella ha sempre tenuto più 
abondante assaj dell’obligo della sua propria portione, poteva Sua Maestà 
haver chiaramente compreso quale fusse l’ardore della nostra Patria nelle 
trattationj della guerra, quale il desiderio non solo del nostro bene ma 
della christianità tutta, e quale sia stato il vigore della nostra Nobiltà con 
il sangue suo proprio di mantenerla. Perciò che non solamente vi haveva 
19. On the role of Donà as leader of the «giovani» in the lively political-cultural and religious 
debate in Venice, Stella, 1986, vol. II, pp. 727-739, in particular pp. 731-732. 
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impiegato le forze delli suoi propri vassalli, ma haveva procurato d’haver 
quelle della Maestà Sua, e d’altrj, et haveva mandato in Armata 400 delli 
nostri Gentilhominj, accioché con il suo proprio petto valorosamente, si 
come si vede, che han fatto, sostenessero l’impeto dell’inimico, e diffen-
dessero questa causa comune (SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, 
Spagna, 6, s. 161 v).
The feeling, however, also gave way to rational considerations that 
Donà, smart and sensitive politician, knew how to grasp and inter-
pret. In reality it was a question of balancing the two levels of personal 
impulse and political realism and, while sacrificing his own convic-
tions to honour the cause of the Lordship, the Ambassador admitted 
on the one hand the failure of the League, and on the other the risk for 
Venice of being deprived of all Levantine possessions:
ma, vedendo finalmente esser tanto grandi le forze dell’inimico che con 
tutta la lega insieme non si è potuto spuntar con lui togliendoli niente dal 
suo, anzi s’è perso grandemente del nostro, et vedendosi manifestamente 
tutti li Statj nostri di Dalmatia et di Levante arsi, depredati et destruttj 
senza alcuna speranza di poter ricever risarcimento, anzi con disperatio-
ne che più si potessero mantenere, haveva la Serenità Vostra convenuto 
pensar a se stessa et considerare che questo suo perseverare nella gue-
rra, poteva essere non solamente la sua rovina ma, perdendo il suo, della 
christianità tutta et partorir insieme differentissimi effetti da quello che 
era nella sua pia, et veramente Christiana intentione. Perciò che se con 
l’haver fatto prova per tre annj continuj si è veduto, che con la guerra non 
solamente non si faceva progresso, ma si perdeva et con tutta la maggior 
Vittoria che mai habbia havuto la christianità, non s’è trovato rimedio di 
far frutto, anzi s’è provocato l’inimico a metter più forze insieme contra 
di noi soli (SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, Spagna, 6, s. 161 v).
The consultation granted by Philip II to Donà and Priuli is an 
example of the mood circulating at the Court regarding Venetian 
“about turn” and the serenity with which the Sovereign received the 
news –which in fact had already come to him from other sources– 
was symptomatic of a situation in which Spain had more to gain than 
to grieve for the “betrayal” of the Republic. In fact, the disengage-
ment from the Mediterranean, with the Ottoman fleet now bent by 
the recent defeat and Flanders in constant revolt, seemed the most 
appropriate solution to address elsewhere the Spanish interests. And 
it was precisely the solution of the political problem in the Nether-
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lands that was dearest to Philip II’s heart, since it was a matter of 
guaranteeing the fidelity and preservation of that decisive part in 
the system of the domains of the Crown (Musi, 2013, pp. 102-110). 
And by requiring the League to bear a financial burden of no lesser 
importance, which took away the energy needed for its commitment 
in Flanders, the Venetian pacification should not have appeared as 
disastrous as it might seem at first glance. The «christiano» and con-
federative spirit to which Pius V had inspired the strict principles of 
the League for the protection of the West from the Turk danger, was 
sacrificed in the name of political opportunism. This is what Donà 
reported about his conversation with Philip II on the afternoon of 
17th April 1573:
Il Re ci udì sempre attentissimamente, et quanto più nel corso del ragio-
namento sentiva la costante modestia del nostro parlare, la quale fu ac-
compagnata da quella affettuosa forma di prononciatione, che così grave 
materia si sumministrava, tanto più con attentione ci mirava, et teneva 
Sua Maestà fermj li occhi verso di noi, né mai fece altro segno con la sua 
faccia, se non, che quando ultimamente udì le conditionj della Pace essere 
state accettate, fece un picciolissimo, et ironico movimento di bocca le-
ggerissimamente sorridendo, con il quale pareva quasi, che Sua Maestà, 
senz’interromperci, volesse dire /Hor su, voi l’havete fatta, sì come tutti 
mi dicevano, che voi fareste/. 
It was the conditions of peace that aroused the curiosity of the 
Sovereign and not so much the conclusion of the agreement between 
Venice and the Porte in itself, as it was only when “he heard the 
conditions” that he nodded, which, in the eyes of the two Ambas-
sadors, left no room for doubt. The burdensome and in many ways 
“humiliating” conditions that the Serenissima had accepted –as will 
be seen later– represented the test of the political choices of Venice, 
for a short time linked to the Western powers against the Turk but 
too “involved” and determined to resume the usual course of its 
policy and its privileged economic relations with Constantinople. 
Not a glance, not a facial expression, not a crack in the voice of 
the Sovereign escaped Donà, who at that time showed all his skill 
and diplomatic ability in the presence of the Catholic King, just as 
shrewd a master of the political scene:
Dipoi Sua Maestà, secondo il suo solito, senza discomponersi punto, et 
trattando con noi con la medesima maniera, che suole far sempre, ci ris-
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pose queste poche parole / Ambasciatori, voi non mi sete mai importunj, 
et havete fatto bene a procurar di parlarmj, ma come, ch’io stava spen-
sieratissimo, che voi mi doveste parlar di cosa tale, et come, che questa 
è attione grande, et di molta consideratione, non è conveniente, ch’io vi 
risponda all’improvviso. Considererò, et vi farò rispondere alcuna cosa/ 
(SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, Spagna, 6, s. 161 v).
The meetings between the Venetian Ambassadors and the com-
ponents of Philip II’s entourage were revelatory of the courtiers 
“feelings” regarding Venetian issues and the way Spanish politics con-
sidered the choice of the Republic. Ruy Gómez de Silva (1516-1573), 
Prince of Eboli, one of the most influential and powerful figures «at 
the court of Spain in the era when that court became the center of 
power in Europe» (Boyden, 1995, p. 2) and leader of the “ebolist 
faction” (Martínez Millán, 1992, pp. 137-198) in the facts of Flan-
ders, reported to Donà that the peace established between Venice and 
Selim II, despite the reasons given by the lagoon State, should be the 
subject of an agreement between the confederates and not a unilateral 
decision of the Serenissima:
Se questa attione di fare la pace o tregua con il Turco era di beneficio 
vostro et di tutti, come io voglio che fusse stato, perché non procurare 
di farla con tutti insieme et con maggior vostro avantaggio? Perché non 
comunicarla con noi et metterci in obligo, quando la fusse stata rotta, di 
ritornare a difendervi? Non havevamo noi nelle Capitolationi della Lega 
che, nelle difficoltà che occorressero tra li collegati, il Papa dovesse essere 
il giudice? (SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, Spagna, 5, ss. 752 v - 
757 r, s. 753 r, Madrid alli 19 di aprile 1573).
Ruy Gómez aimed straight at the Venetian liability for having vio-
lated the Rome agreements and for having acted in the sole interest 
of the Republic. Antonio de Toledo –prior of the Order of St. John 
of Jerusalem, Councilor of State and brother of the very powerful 
Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alba– declared to the Span-
ish ambassadors that he had always been against the constitution of 
the League, as «il suo parere è stato sempre, che questa Lega non 
facesse il privato comodo del suo Re, né delli suoi Stati, perché egli 
conosceva molto bene che non li apportava frutto nessuno, et che li 
faceva fare una soverchia spesa, vanamente» (SAV, Archivi propri de-
gli Ambasciatori, Spagna, 5, ss. 757 r-760r, s. 757 r). Even though he 
understood the reasons given by the diplomats regarding the agree-
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ment reached with the Turk, Toledo accused Venice of misconduct, 
something which would have been difficult to justify:
In due cose però, a me pare che, alla Signoria si possa attribuire di questa 
attione alcuna colpa, volendo tener tutto il resto, per le ragioni dette dalle 
Signorie Vostre, per giustificato: la prima è, che tenendo la Signoria questa 
negotiatione di Pace già tanto tempo, non l’habbia comunicata, sì com’era 
conveniente, con li suoi confederati […]. L’altra cosa, della quale a me in 
verità […] molto pesa è, che io non so vedere come la Signoria, restando 
debole come resta, possa fidarsi di questa conclusione di pace, per ciò che 
se, quando il Turco non haveva alcuna offesa da lei, gli ha rotta la Pace, 
et l’ha ingannata, come si può credere, che le debbi osservare la presente 
[…]? […] Io non so comprendere, che sicurtà possa haver la Signoria di 
questa Pace, et come possa esser stato bono il suo consiglio (SAV, Archivi 
propri degli Ambasciatori, Spagna, 5, ss. 757 r - 760r, s. 757 r).
The Spanish Court had consolidated a single line of thinking re-
garding the Venetian conciliation with the Turk and the grievances 
against the two ambassadors of the Republic seemed to revolve 
around two indisputable objections: the lack of information about 
the abandonment of the League; the omission to the confederates 
on the start of peace negotiations with Selim II. And to the compact 
front created in the Philip’s entourage, Donà and Priuli were able to 
oppose only the fine art of diplomacy and to prove themselves right 
by exposing the Venetian merits in Lepanto and pleading for the 
economic needs of the Republic because of the heavy commitments 
during the long war. The two ambassadors knew very well that those 
“omissions” to which they referred –in different ways and with differ-
ent words– Ruy Gómez de Silva or Antonio de Toledo, did not leave 
room for “negotiations”, if anything they highlighted the “faults” of 
the Serenissima. And among these responsibilities attributed to the 
Republic, implicit and explicit, there was the claim of independence 
from Spanish political hegemony –not adhering to the «processo di 
ispanizzazione» (Musi, 2013, p. 84)– had emerged in all its evidence 
in the recent decision of Venice to sign the peace with the Ottoman 
government. Philip II’s answer –«Considererò, et vi farò rispondere 
alcuna cosa», had said the King– reached Donà and Priuli through 
the Secretary Antonio Pérez (1540-1611) (Marañon, 1947) on 8th May, 
about a month after the conversation in which the ambassadors had 
communicated to the Sovereign the news of the conciliation with the 
Turk. Pérez announced 
291
UNA COMPLEJA MISIÓN DIPLOMÁTICA. 
LEONARDO DONÀ EN LA CORTE ESPAÑOLA DE FILIPO II (1570-1573)
Che Sua Maestà crede che ad haversi condotto la Signoria a far questa 
Pace con il Turco, apartandosi da Lega così Santa, et solenne, et che era 
in tanto beneficio particolar della Republica, deve essere stata mossa da 
cause molto bastanti, et forzose. Che Sua Maestà si mosse ad entrar in 
questa Lega, per il servitio di Dio, et bene de la christianità, et per rispetto 
di Sua Santità, che fu il Procurator di essa, et per il bene, et per la diffesa 
della Repubblica, la quale si ritrovava in così fatta strettura et necessità. 
Et che crede Sua Maestà medesima, che, tenendo essa Repubblica questa 
obligatione, et essendo debitrice a Sua Maestà per così buona sua volontà, 
dimostrata con tante buone opere, le corrisponderà, per la parte sua, sì 
come è il dovere (SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, Spagna, 5, ss. 
776 v - 778 v, s. 776 v, Madrid alli 9 di maggio 1573). 
To complement the work of Donà and Priuli, the Signoria sent 
Giovanni Soranzo to Madrid as an ambassador exceptional. Having 
arrived in the Spanish capital at the end of June 1973, Soranzo had the 
task of giving Philip II further clarifications on the peace agreements 
negotiated by the Republic. The three Venetian ambassadors, after 
repeated requests for an audience, were only received by the King 
thanks to the intercession of Pérez, in mid-September. And, therefore, 
Soranzo could inform the Signoria:
volendo esequire, quello che la Serenità Vostra ha commesso a me Soran-
zo, in materia della resolutione, che Lei fece di accettare la Pace, che le fu 
offerta dal Signor Turco, poiché giudicassimo non esser più tempo di dire 
a Sua Maestà le molte particolarità, che sono occorse […] le dissi, che con-
tinuando la Serenità Vostra nella sua solita, antica affettione, et osservantia, 
che porta alla Maestà Sua Chatolica […] se ben certa che questi signori 
Ambasciatori […] havevano rappresentata a Sua Maestà la necessaria riso-
lutione, che la Serenità Vostra prese in accettare la Pace, che le fu offerta 
dal Signor Turco […] volse che tutto la intendesse, da persona mandatale 
particolarmente, et fece elettione di me […] et, ben intese le ragioni, et le 
cause importantissime, che fece risolvere la Serenità Vostra in questo, fusse 
la Maestà Sua per continuare nel solito suo buon animo verso le cose nostre 
(SAV, Archivi propri degli Ambasciatori, Spagna, XVII, ss. 24 r - 24v). 
All the justifications and reasons “in favour” of the Serenissima 
for the peace with the Sublime Porte had an international echo and 
aroused more than some perplexity among the states that had confed-
erated and fought together in Lepanto. From Venice, Diego Guzmán 
de Silva wrote to Sancho de Guevara y Padilla on 4th April, 1573, a 
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month after the peace treaty had been agreed between the two states, 
(† 1585), Spanish ambassador in Genoa and future Governor of Mi-
lan, declaring he had had the possibility to talk to Francesco Barbaro 
«el hijo del Baylo que […] tienen en Constantinopla» (AGS, E, L. 
1403, s. 36), who was in Venice to submit to the Senate the chapter of 
peace to be signed and returned to the Ottoman capital. In addition, 
in the document Guzmán de Silva informed de Guevara that he had 
been summoned by the Doge Alvise I Mocenigo who informed him 
with a «muy largo razonamiento sobra las cosas que le havian movido 
a hazer la paz con el Turco la qual había sido mas forçosa que volun-
taria» (AGS, E, L. 1403, s. 36). 
The Doge also confirmed to him that the government of the Re-
public would abide by the conditions stipulated with Constantinople, 
forced by imperative needs. Venice, therefore, admitted the onerous 
nature of peace and the most urgent economic need to re-establish 
relations with the Ottoman Sultanate. On 6th April 1573 Gian Andrea 
Doria wrote directly to Philip II about the news received from Ven-
ice by Guzmán de Silva. The Genoese admiral deplored the Venetian 
choice of pacification with the Porte, considering it a risky decision 
that, according to Doria, the Serenissima would have taken «sin haver 
tenido miramiento al daño que de ello puede resultar a toda la cristi-
andad y a su misma Republica, que es cosa que no se puede dexar de 
sentir mucho» (AGS, E, 1403, s. 125).
It was a precise stance towards the lagoon city, its politics and its 
choice to prefer the ancient vocation for trade and relations with the 
East. Two days after the news was made official by Donà and Priuli at 
the Spanish Court, on 29th April Philip II sent two «despachos» of the 
same tenor to Genoa, one addressed to Sancho de Guevara y Padilla 
(AGS, E, 1403, s. 229) and the other to Gian Andrea Doria (AGS, E, 
1403, s. 259). To both of them the Spanish sovereign communicated 
that he had got to know the reasons for peace, to repeat the words 
of the King, the «grandes necesitades» that «havian forçado a hazer 
la paz con el Turco». But he said he was in any case perplexed about 
these decisions, so much so that he waited for further information be-
cause it was «menester mirar», it was necessary to observe the changes 
that were taking place on the international political scene. Philip also 
asked his ambassador Sancho de Guevara to supervise the negotia-
tions and «los negocios» between Venice and the Porte. An important 
ally like the Republic, whose contribution had been decisive for the 
naval victory of Lepanto, had to be, in any case, controlled and ob-
293
UNA COMPLEJA MISIÓN DIPLOMÁTICA. 
LEONARDO DONÀ EN LA CORTE ESPAÑOLA DE FILIPO II (1570-1573)
served in its political choices even if the interests of the Serenissima 
had resumed the links to the the East.
While Venice decided to abandon the Western alliance mainly cre-
ated to contain Turkish expansionism in the Mediterranean and opted 
to re-establish political and trade relations with the Porte at the cost 
of a peace in many ways “mortifying”, in the West Philip II continued 
to be the main adversary of Constantinople. The hegemony of Spain 
in international relations and the resulting political leadership guar-
anteed Madrid a number of allies and partners to rely on. Among the 
many, Ferrante Gonzaga, first Marquis of Castiglione (1544-1586), 
who at the end of that year (16th November, 1573) reaffirmed his loy-
alty to Spain and stressed, to be credited by the Sovereign, the «en 
prejuicio de la cristiandad» (AGS, E, 1403, s. 190).
After Lepanto, therefore, Venice showed more interest in rebuild-
ing relations with the Ottoman Empire, setting up a difficult negotiat-
ing table with the government of Selim II. At least two strategies seem 
to have been implemented by the Serenissima after Lepanto:
1) a conscious action – albeit within the framework of a “humiliat-
ing” peace – to find and follow the manners of trade with the Otto-
man East, according to its ancient vocation;
2) the political awareness resulting from this choice, which led 
Venice to favour an independent action for the benefit of its own in-
terests, in spite of the Western policy based on containing the Turk 
danger in the Mediterranean and attracted to the orbit of the Spanish 
system of power. 
It is still a double perspective in which the relations between 
Venice and the Porte must be considered: the first is that of com-
mercial relations; the second is that of political relations. These two 
elements constituted the essence of the bond between the two states 
which, between war clashes alternated with long periods of peace, 
built a preferential axis between Venice and Constantinople on 
which men, goods, ideas and cultures moved. The period of peace 
inaugurated in 1573 lasted until the following century, when new 
vicissitudes led to the clash over the possession of Candia (between 
1645 and 1669). 
3. The weight of responsibilities
Facciasi dunque la pace, né si guardi a comperarla, quando anche occo-
rresse; poiché è investita, non costo, quello, che risparmia il molto, ed un 
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molto, che risparmiato, può ancor valere all’’intera ricupera dell’investito 
(Verdizzotti, 1698, p. 166). 
With these words Alvise Mocenigo spoke to the Council of Ten 
«per terminare positivamente sopra questa gran materia» (Verdiz-
zotti, 1698, p. 164), sealing the agreement with the Turk since, ac-
cording to the Doge, the result that the Republic would achieve with 
the peace, had no economic equivalent. At the conclusion of what 
historiography has defined as the “War of Cyprus” and which had 
forced Venice for more than three years to a heavy war effort, the sign-
ing of the treaty with the Ottoman Empire generated a debate about 
the responsibilities, be them real or alleged, that had led the parties 
to the agreement.
The documentary sources give back to the historical knowledge 
the “feelings” that fostered the Venetian political debate after the 
peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire. And it seems almost obvious 
to say that the controversy gave rise to many considerations, causing 
a confrontation in which, inevitably, there was no single view. Just as 
the Venetian press had inaugurated the commemorative cycle on the 
occasion of the victory of Lepanto, exalting the duties of the Holy 
League and its supporters, in the same way, after the peace with the 
Turk, both writings that pointed to Spain (Barcia, 1995, pp. 179-
206) as the only “guilty party” of the determinations to which the 
Republic had come, and the expressions of a feeling contrary to the 
peaceful resolution and that called the Lagoon City to its responsi-
bilities to the Christian West began to circulate: «ogni Signor Chris-
tiano […] è tenuto aiutare a scacciare i nemici di Santa Chiesa, e 
come sodisfano i Venitiani a questa loro obligatione con questa loro 
pace! certo male: anci fanno il contrario rendendo a questo modo 
più gagliardo et audace il Nemico di Santa Chiesa e più deboli e più 
timorosi i difensori di quella»20. The Republic was held responsible 
for an arbitrary choice, since it should not have «conchiudere tal 
pace, se prima da Nostra Santità non otteniva tal licenza» (MNL, 
ms. It., VII 807 (=9558), s. I). It was the responsibility of the Pope, 
in his role of protector and guarantor of the League, to grant the 
Serenissima Republic the licence for the conclusion of agreements 
with Selim II. The fact remained that the Turk was considered the 
20. MNL, ms. It., VII 807 (=9558), Ragioni perché la Repubblica non dovea concludere la Pace con 
Turchi, s. III. As the source does not indicate the numbering of pages, the writer has considered 
it appropriate to refer to a numerical order expressed in Roman numerals from I to XXXII, as 
such are the pages that constitute the manuscript, excluding from the numbering the title page 
bearing the title.
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main enemy of the Christian West, which in turn, to defend its in-
terests from Ottoman expansionism, had federated under the papal 
banner. Despite the safeguarding of the common interests coagu-
lated around the Holy League, it was not a duty of the Pope – as 
head of the Catholic Church – to control the activities of each indi-
vidual “federated” State. Therefore, the Pope (at first Pius V, then 
Gregory XIII) could not have prevented that «i membri gli siano 
rubelli, inobedienti, ovvero nascosamente l›abbandonino, accostan-
dosi a’ Nemici» as it had happened in Venice: «havendo dunque 
quest’Illustrissima Republica, notabil membro del Christianesimo, 
contratta la Pace con comuni Nemici, e nascostamente, chi non di-
rebbe tal Republica in ciò essere proceduta illegitimamente, et in 
danno di tutta la Christiana Republica, che più grava questo mesfat-
to» (MNL, ms. It., VII 807 (=9558), s. II). The question, therefore, 
concerned two points: the general damage caused by the Serenis-
sima to the entire «Christiana» community and the transgression of 
allied agreements: «trovandosi dunque questa Christiana Republica 
Venitiana soggetta al Papa Capo e Pastore di tutti i Christiani, alme-
no per conto della Religione, non dovea mai se non con il consenso 
di esso Papa contrattare tal Pace con infideli nostri comuni nemici» 
(MNL, ms. It., VII 807 (=9558), s. III).
If Venice was in «tanta necessità» (MNL, ms. It., VII 807 (=9558), 
s. XI), it was necessary, however, to grant some mitigation to the po-
litical choices of the Venetian government and to the “talked about” 
decision to reach the peace. Even if the choice itself is disputed, as 
emerged from the source, for the fault of the Serenissima, a series of 
justifications result, most probably, of a feeling of city partisanship: 
Che poi sia stato malfatto a far pace con infedeli o perché la pace sia 
cattiva in sé, ovvero per danno che porti ad altri, ovvero nel modo in far-
la; […] venitiani si possano giustamente iscusare da tutti questi tre capi. 
Imperoché la pace fu sempre istimata per cosa buona, santa, amabile, et 
desiderabile, il che facilmente si scorge dal suo contrario, cioè dalla dis-
cordia, discensioni, e guerra, ai danni, ingiurie, miserie, calamità, et rovina 
(MNL, ms. It., VII 807 (=9558), s. XI). 
The responsibility of Venice (the «tre capi»: to have concluded the 
agreement with the infidels, to have caused damage to Christianity 
and to have operated keeping the allies unaware) and the “deplor-
able” actions carried out could only be mitigated in the light of the 
general process of pacification which opposed the unrest, the mourn-
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ing and the damage caused by the war. The peace was also inspired by 
practical needs that touched the heart of the Venetian economy and, 
as had also emerged from the words of the Doge mentioned above, 
only the cessation of hostilities would guarantee the Serenissima a re-
turn to the usual business activities and a recovery of the accounts 
drained for the war. Continuing the conflict with the Ottoman Empire 
would, in essence, have caused a series of incalculable damages to 
the Republic and its Levantine possessions: «essi Venitiani ogni mese 
[…] in cento galere spendevano 100 mila scudi qual spesa continuava 
per molti mesi, et anni. Oltre che era necessario aumentare i presidij 
in Candia, Cefalonia, Zante, Corfù et Zara, dove si spendeva più del 
solito altrettanto» (MNL, ms. It., VII 807 (=9558), s. XX). 
The belligerency with the Turk had exposed all the strategic Vene-
tian possessions in the heart of the Mediterranean to serious danger 
and to defend them, the Signoria faced very high costs. If this was the 
situation on the islands, Venice was not in a better position:
In Città di Vinegia poi solita a cavare a migliaia de scuti all’anno de’ suoi 
datij per li trafichi di mare erano ridotti a centenaia, et meno, et per man-
car le facende li mercanti si partivano, laonde le loro case, fondachi, et 
botteghe restavano vuote, et i negoci si trasferivano altrove. Di più per 
sustentar la guerra insupportabilmente aggravavano sé et i sudditi, onde 
non haveriano potuto durare sotto a tanto peso. Che più havevano impo-
verito tutte le sue Città, et sudditi d’huomini da remo, di maniera che più 
non trovavano galeotti, né i sudditi che lavorasse i loro terreni (MNL, ms. 
It., VII 807 (=9558), ss. XX-XXI).
In mitigating and limiting the responsibilities of Venice for having 
concluded the peace with the Turk, the precarious conditions of its 
economy and the relative “suffering” of the subjects, turned out to be 
the most reliable justification, the one that best represented the reality 
of things, partly rehabilitating the Republic in the face of the perplex-
ity of the confederates for its ambiguous behaviour. Because of the 
conflict, moreover, as already said, the granary supplies of the Repub-
lic –which usually got its supplies in the East– were scarce (remember 
the requests to meet the granary supplies from Naples and Sicily made 
by Donà to Philip II) and the islands mentioned paid a very high price 
because of the shortage of grains:
Gli habitanti le sudette Isole soliti a procacciarsi il mangiare dalla Mo-
rea, et resto dalla Grecia trovandosi privi di vittovaglie per questa guerra 
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chiamando del pane, et non potendo Venetiani soccorrere al lor bisogno 
per non haver grano, né volendogline dare gli Agenti per il Re Philippo 
in Puglia et in Sicilia, s’ammutinavano, et chiamavano il Turco, al quale 
se et l’Isole offerivano in prezzo di pane. Né forza vi era a bastanza per 
resisterli (MNL, ms. It., VII 807 (=9558), s. XXI).
Venice, in this way, posed the problem of safeguarding its own 
interests, which, placed before any other argument, should have 
“spared” it from the charge of “betrayal” against the Holy League. 
How to «biasimare la pace»? What was the «maggior pregiuducio alla 
Christianità, o la detta pace, overo che ’l Turco fusse diventato signore 
di dette Isole»? (MNL, ms. It., VII 807 (=9558), s. XXI). The answer 
to the question for the Venetians was obvious and there was no doubt 
about the lawfulness of the peace stipulated with the Porte because 
the preservation of the State and the incalculable damage resulting 
from the possible loss of possessions in the Mediterranean were at 
stake. And it was clearly stated that «i Signori Venetiani non sono 
vassalli del Papa, et meno del Re Philippo» (MNL, ms. It., VII 807 
(=9558), s. XXII). A perfectly legitimate way to express the senses of 
one’s own decision-making autonomy.
If some attenuating circumstance could be granted to Venice in 
the question of the “incorrect” conduct towards the confederates, 
no less responsibility began to be attributed to Spain for the attitude 
taken before and after Lepanto. In fact, it was precisely in the Spanish 
political choices that was seen the responsibility both for the failure of 
the league and for the decision of the Serenissima forced to conclude 
the peace with the Turk because of the “ambiguous” behaviour of the 
Filipino government. These themes also emerged in the contribution 
by Paolo Paruta21 regarding the «de’ Veneziani co’ Turchi». Paruta 
called for caution and believed that the Turk forces, despite being 
rejected at Lepanto, would soon recover and would not allow any 
respite to the confederates, as it was clear that even though «essendo 
stati li Turchi sbattuti e vinti sul mare, ma conservando intiere le forze 
di terra, non ha lo stato loro quasi sentito tale percossa» (Paruta, in 
Monzani, 1852, p. 434). And the greatest risk would have been taken 
mainly by Venice, given the geographical proximity of its possessions 
to the Ottoman Empire since, observed Paruta, «lo stato della Signo-
21. The contribution that historiography has dedicated to the work of Paruta is copious. Please 
refer to Comani, 1894; Candeloro, 1936, pp. 70-97 e 1936, pp. 51-79; Tria, 1941; Pillinini, 1964, 
pp. 5-28; Cozzi, 1963-1964, pp. 215-294 e 1997, pp. 13-86; Baiocchi, 1975-1976, pp. 157-233; Za-




Cultura Latinoam. Volumen 30, número 2, julio-diciembre 2019, pp. 268-309
ria è quasi da ogni parte esposto all’impeto del nemico, che da mare 
e da terra per li suoi propri confini può molestarlo» (Paruta, in Mon-
zani, 1852, p. 436). The geographical configuration of the Venetian 
possessions did not allow an effective and immediate management in 
critical moments and during the wars it posed serious problems both 
for the defence and for the supplies.: «sono ancora i membri delli 
suoi stati così divisi, che nelli tempi di guerra vi bisognano grossissimi 
presidii per potere fornirli tutti, e buona parte d’armata per poter soc-
correrli secondo il bisogno: le quali cose portano seco necessità d’una 
grandissima spesa» (Paruta, in Monzani, 1852, p. 436). In support of 
the achievement of the peace between Venice and the Porte, Paruta, 
with the usual “patriotic” spirit, reminded his readers that
la città piena di numerosissimo popolo, quale vive e si nutrisce di varie in-
dustrie , cessando queste per la guerra, veniva a ridursi in somma povertà; 
dove per la pace fiorendo tutte le arti, la città si conserva viva e d’ogni cosa 
abbondante, e insieme con le private si accrescono le ricchezze pubbliche 
per li traffichi delle nazioni del Levante (Paruta, in Monzani, 1852, p. 438).
The political decision to conclude the peace had taken into account 
all these reasons which, according to Paruta, amply justified the actions 
of the Republic, because «sarebbe stata non fede, non prudenza, non 
zelo cristiano, ma pazza ostinazione volere […] continuare tuttavia nel-
la spesa e nelli travagli della guerra» (Paruta, in Monzani, 1852, p.440). 
Paruta was worried about the formidable power of the Ottoman Em-
pire which, even after Lepanto, was a military and political bloc too 
strong to be broken. The awareness of the Ottoman military superiority, 
the need to restore peace and recompose the political and economic 
structures affected by the war, the Spanish “disengagement” to ensure 
the defense of Venetian possessions, were valid reasons to relieve the 
Republic of responsibility towards Rome and Madrid.
If these reasons were not enough, Paruta pointed out that the inter-
est in the preservation of territorial integrity was a legitimate duty of 
every state and, therefore, just as the government of Philip had made 
every effort for the cause in the Flanders (Moretti, 1994, pp. 129-164), 
so Venice would be committed to protecting the territories exposed 
to the Ottoman conquest22. The political position of Paruta emerged 
22. Paruta clarifies this concept well: «Perocché, gravissimo pericolo ella vedeva soprastare al 
regno di Candia, quando, per sorte, […] si fosse incontrata nelle medesime difficoltà, per le quali 
non si avesse potuto, se non molto tardi, ovvero forse mai, prevalersi delle forze intiere della lega 
per soccorrere quell’isola; la quale non essendo meno cara né meno importante alla Signoria, che 
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clearly –«originale e scevra da imitazioni» (Pompeati, 1905, p. 300)– 
enthusiastic supporter of the peace between Venice and Selim II and 
defender of a sincere feeling «di ragione, di libertà, di giustizia eterna 
di amor patrio» (Zanoni, 1904, p. 44). If the naval victory of Lepanto 
seemed to undermine the Ottoman power and ignited, among many, 
the hope of a lasting alliance against the common enemy, the scenarios 
changed in a short span of time. 
The turning point for the peace between Venice and Selim II de-
finitively brought to an end the underlying tensions that had marked 
the relations between the confederates since the initial formation of 
the League. During 1572, if on the one hand carrying out the tasks 
assumed by the League was still considered a possibility –as seen be-
fore– on the other hand it was the year of the reckoning, since what 
happened in that period of time decided the fate of the whole affair.
Some facts were decisive and, as it often happens, a chain of causes 
influenced the course of events:
a) Philip II’s willingness to block naval operations in the summer 
of that year by keeping Don Giovanni’s fleet stationary in Messina and 
preventing the possible attack on the Turkish fleet;
b) the growing conflict between Spain and its historical rival, 
France, of the young Charles IX and his mother Catherine de’ Medici 
who, while committed to fighting the Huguenots (Lapeyre, 1992, pp. 
123-143) continued to cultivate animosity towards Spain and joined 
the England of Elizabeth Tudor signing in Blois, 19th April, an agree-
ment in anti-Spanish function;
c) the resurgence of the revolt in the Flanders, where the insur-
rection of Flessinga (the strategic port of Zeeland at the mouth of 
the Western Scheldt in the North Sea) and the spread of the upris-
ings to other important centres such as Mons and Valenciennes, were 
grounds for serious concern for both Philip II and his government.
The challenge in Lepanto, therefore, could not quench the minds 
of either the Spaniards or the Venetians because the worrying –and 
complex– international scenario did not allow the détente neces-
sary to direct the forces towards a common goal. Venice and Madrid 
chased different “routes”. Since the beginning of 1572 the Spanish 
had directed the naval forces –as already mentioned– to North Africa 
to conduct a military action on Algiers and other barbaric powers.
siano li stati di Fiandra al re cattolico, doveva con ogni diligenza […] procurare di assicurarla in 
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Thanks to the rearmament of the fleet after Lepanto, the Turks 
managed, in 1574, to also regain Tunis. The strategy adopted by the 
Spanish to take possession of the so-called Barbary Coast did not have 
the desired effects, as the maintenance and defence of the «roccaforti 
costiere era dispendiosa e inaffidabile, visto che esse potevano venire 
abbattute dal nemico una alla volta, allorché l’attenzione della Spagna 
era rivolta altrove» (Casey, 1992, pp. 55-87, p. 79). 
Philip II and Murad III came to call a truce in 1578, an inevi-
table step, as the two states were engaged on different fronts: Spain in 
northern Europe, the Ottoman Empire to quell the revolts in Persia. 
By then it was clear that the danger for Spain came from the coasts of 
North Africa and the truce established with Murad III did not solve 
the problems of the barbaric raids on the Spanish coasts that, unpre-
pared for a war of that type, paid a very high price because of the raids 
and harassment perpetuated by pirates. Even before Lepanto, Venice 
tried to open the negotiating table with the Porte with the mediation 
of the bailout Marcantonio Barbaro, who was forcibly held in Con-
stantinople. The first peace mission was entrusted to the Secretary of 
the Senate Jacopo Ragazzoni (1528-1610) (Brunelli, 2016), who left 
Venice on 11th March, 1571, «arrivò a Costantinopoli il 26 aprile e il 
suo primo dispaccio, che è dell’8 maggio, fu ricevuto a Venezia l’11 
giugno, mentre il trattato di lega, com’è noto, fu firmato il 19 maggio» 
(Brunetti e Vitale, 1963, vol. I, p. XXXIX; Paruta, 1827, pp. 163 and 
following). 
The Venetian initiative proceeded on a parallel track, between 
Rome and Constantinople, between the constitution of the Holy 
League and the attempt at peace with the Turk and the proximity of 
the dates makes well understood the interests at stake and the will of 
the Republic to create a margin for negotiation on both fronts. But 
this tactical parallelism, rather than a double game conducted with 
Machiavellian intent, was the consequence of the conflict between the 
intentions of the Council of Ten, which worked for peace, and those 
of the Senate, «in cui prevalse il partito favorevole alla guerra, e che 
riuscì ad imporla, togliendo l’iniziativa all’eccelso Consiglio ed avo-
cando per una volta a sé la materia» (Brunetti e Vitale, 1963, vol. I, 
p. XXXIX). Ragazzoni’s mission ended without success and the facts 
are well known. The intentions of the Ottoman Empire to expand 
into the Mediterranean knew no obstacles, the taking of Cyprus was 
proof of this and before Lepanto, when Ragazzoni was sent to Con-
stantinople for the attempt at peace, Sokollu Mehmet Pasha declared 
to the Venetian envoy:
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Mi replicò il magnifico pascià, che sarebbe per la serenità vostra stata mol-
to migliore la pace, che la guerra, perché le sue forze non erano sufficienti 
a poter contendere con una potenza così grande, come era quella del suo 
imperatore, con la quale egli avrebbe occupato non solamente Cipro ma 
ancora altre parti dello stato suo, che poi anco la serenità vostra avrebbe 
avuto di grazia di far pace; soggiungendo che, per le loro profezie, dove-
vano i Turchi esser padroni fino di Roma23.
But at that time the Ottoman Empire made its choice and did not 
find it convenient to grant margins of negotiation to the Republic, es-
pecially after the political solution reached in Transylvania –where in 
1571 the newborn Principality took power, the noble Báthory family 
under direct Ottoman control– allowed the Turk to concentrate their 
forces on the Mediterranean. The fact that there no longer was the 
Turkish will to regulate the terms of a peace, was well understood by 
Ragazzoni who, in the Report to the Senate held after the return from 
the mission in Constantinople, said that he understood that the Otto-
man government wanted to «metter ancor tempo di mezzo in questo 
trattato» (Relazione by Jacopo Ragazzoni in Albèri, 1844, p. 93). The 
hegemonic project of the Porte looked towards the West:
in luogo della pace […] aveva volto l’animo e i pensieri suoi tutti alla 
guerra, perciocché aveva accomodato le cose cogli imperiali a suo modo, 
avendo stabilito (il che grandemente gli premeva) nel regno di Transilva-
nia un dipendente dal Gran Signore. Da ciò nasceva, che l’esercito guida-
to da Acmet pascià poteva liberamente voltarsi a danni di vostra serenità 
(Relazione by Jacopo Ragazzoni in Albèri, 1844, p. 93).
In the waters of the Curzolari, as has been said many times, the 
League stopped only temporarily the powerful Ottoman enemy. 
The unsuccessful mission of Ragazzoni was followed by the peace of 
1573. Because of these agreements, relations between Venice and Ma-
drid were completely compromised. In the Serenissima the Spaniards 
saw the amancebada of the Turk and the Spaniards did not have a bet-
ter fate in the collective imaginary of the lagoon. For the age of Philip 
II Bruno Anatra has defined the relations between the two states as 
the result of «due prudenze a confronto» (Anatra, 1988, pp. 29-48) 
and Paolo Preto has reinforced the message by defining the bond as 
«due diffidenze a confronto» (Preto, 2003, pp. 201-226, p. 203) and 
23. «Relazione dell’Impero ottomano di Jacopo Ragazzoni presentata nel suo ritorno da Costanti-
nopoli il 16 agosto 1571», in Albèri, 1844, pp. 77-102, pp. 84-85.
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between prudence and distrust there was certainly the need to find a 
third way that would guarantee everyone their own “living space” of 
influence. 
Of course, the “record” in international relations that Spain was 
entitled to in the West was out of question, but Venice was able to 
adapt, within a defined geopolitical space, and find a relative autono-
my that allowed the Republic to play a defined role in the context of 
the sixteenth-century European states. If between the signing of the 
treaty establishing the Holy League and the naval success of Lepanto 
it seemed that, as we have seen, a unified spirit of crusade, encour-
aged and supervised by Pius V, was emerging, after 1573 the scenar-
io changed: the amancebada of the Gran Signore blamed both the 
League’s failures and the obligatory choice of concluding the peace 
only on the «perfidia de spagnoli»24. 
From “caution”, to “diffidence”, finally to “deceitfulness”: it was 
the escalation of a strong anti-Spanish feeling and a rejection of Phil-
ip’s politics despite the intense Hispano-Venetian relations both on 
a cultural and artistic level (Hope, 1988, pp. 49-72; Pérez Sánchez, 
1988, pp. 79-102; Anselmi, 2014). The interests at stake were politi-
cally divergent and the Venetians had absolutely no doubts about the 
Spanish responsibility for the damage suffered in Corfu and in the 
other Mediterranean islands in its possession. Having to find the army 
again in May 1571, according to the agreements contained in the Capi-
tolazioni, to defend the possessions in Corfu
per colpa de spagnoli non solo non si vene a detto tempo a Corfù, ma si 
tardò tanto che l’armata Turchesca uscì liberamente fuori, et fece molti 
danni in Candia, al Zante et alla Zeffalonia di prede, di rapine, et di incen-
dij, et prese poi ancora Dolcigno, et Antivari, talché facendo progresso et 
venendo inanti fu necessario a quell’armata de venetiani che si ritrovava a 
Corfù disloggiare, et andarsene, come andò a Messina (MNL, ms. It., VII, 
681 (=7953), s. 10 v).
The accusations for the delays and for the “ambiguity” of the 
Spanish attitude during the years of the Cyprus war exploded after 
the establishment of the peace between Venice and Selim II. Among 
commonplaces, real or presumed accusations, there was the definitive 
dissolution of the League that, apart from Lepanto, had not brought 
24. MNL, It., VII, 681 (=7953), Discorso sopra la pace giustamente fatta da venetiani con il Turco 
per la perfidia de spagnoli, ff. 1 r - 51 v. 
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to a successful conclusion the intentions that had inspired its forma-
tion. Venice claimed its autonomy and did not hide its resentment 
towards Spain:
Queste sono le fedeli compagnie, queste sono le amorevolezze de colle-
gati, et in questa sorta de genti non potevano certo venetiani confidare, 
ne sperare se non infelicissime cose. Dicono questi sviscerati de Spagnoli, 
che venetiani devono haver grand’obbligo a questa Lega, et a questa na-
tione perché si ella non fusse stata non si otteneva la vittoria, ne era sicuro 
alcun luogo della loro Repubblica dalli confini del Turco fino a Venetia, ne 
Venetia istessa (MNL, ms. It., VII, 681 (=7953), s. 12 v).
With the dissolution of the Holy League all the disagreements 
which during the alliance had been dulled by diplomatic prudence 
and by the uncertainties of the political scenarios that had emerged. 
From the cycle of praise initiated in Venice to celebrate the victory of 
Lepanto and exalt the work of Philip II and the Pope, to the role of 
amancebada attributed to the Serenissima, to the «perfidia de’ spag-
noli», the Cyprus war, which had imposed the highest price on Ven-
ice, came full circle. 
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